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08.12.2006
Should 3.5% be the end of the story?
Given what we know about the current stance of monetary policy, it is hardly defendable to take a patient wait-and-see attitude. In evaluating the policy stance it is necessary to take a long-run view and to analyse the trends in money creation and interest rates. Money is the long-run anchor of asset and consumer prices. As a rule of thumb the trend growth of money should equal the ECB’s normative rate of inflation (2 %) plus the product of the income elasticity of money demand (1.5) and the trend rate of real income growth (1994-2006: 2 %). The formula provides an inflation-neutral growth rate for the money stock M3 of 5 %. This yardstick implies that monetary policy is much too accommodative since spring 2001; see the money chart. No surprise that the ECB has not succeeded in keeping inflation at the desired level of close to but below 2 % during recent years. Since the turn of the century consumer price inflation has moved around an average level of 2.2 % even though the economy has grown at a moderate annual rate of 1.8 % on average. Moreover, money and credit are accelerating. Since early 2005 M3 is rising at a rate of 8.5 %. The money overhang exceeds 14 % meanwhile. Indeed, by all money measures liquidity is ample, thanks to a generally too timid conduct of interest rate policy. Too fast money growth indicates that the ECB’s supply price of money, represented by the interest rate on overnight money, is too low. Theory suggests that the real overnight rate, i.e. the overnight rate deflated by the rate of inflation, must not undercut the economy’s trend rate of growth (2%) to secure price stability in the long run. But fact is that the real overnight rate has moved widely below this number since mid-2001; see the interest rate chart. This long-lasting policy of cheap money is at the heart of the explanation of the observed excessive money growth. Though the most recent decision of the ECB brings some correction, it is by no means sufficient. Deflating the nominal supply price of 3.5 % by the ECB’s inflation objective yields a real supply price of 1.5 % instead of 2 %. Thus, it would require lifting the ECB’s nominal supply price by another 50 basis points, hence to 4 %, in order to achieve a level that is compatible with price stability in long-run equilibrium.
Note that this is not the complete story because the economy is not growing alongside an equilibrium path of normal growth and price stability but stronger. If this continues, it will become necessary to target a non-accomodative interest rate level of 4.25 %. The consensus GDP forecast is 2.7 % for this year and 2.2 % for next year. The odds are that the forecasters are repeating the error of last year when they greatly underestimated the strength of the economy. In addition, it appears overly optimistic to assume that average inflation will fall below this year’s level of 2.2 %, the more so, the longer the ECB hesitates to further drive up its supply price.
The accommodative policy stance needs to come to an end, the sooner, the better. The members of the Governing council should know that even though they do not advertise it. The oncoming meeting of 11 January provides an opportunity for further correction that must not be missed.
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Comments
Sebastian Dullien from Germany
Friday, 15-12-06 10:52
Reading Prof. Neumann’s post, I am a little surprised that he does not make any reference to the current economic situation but relies for his argument of strong growth dynamic in 2007 and imminent inflationary pressure on the monetary analysis which has not proved to be overly useful for forecasting short-term developments over the past years – be it inflation or economic growth. In the world of professional analysts - people who are evaluated against the accuracy of their calls - monetary analysis has fallen out of fashion. I know of no single professional forecaster who forecasts that the gap observed by Prof. Neumann between M3 growth and the target rate of – by now - an accumulated 9 percent (see his figure above) will lead to a surge in inflation anywhere close to that value over their forecast horizon until 2008. Instead, almost all are forecasting inflation very close to 2 percent over the two years. Even among academics, the number of advocates of pure monetary analysis is diminishing rapidly. At the ECB conference on 'The Role of Money in Monetary Policy', Mike Woodford even proposed that there was no role for money for central banks’ actions at all.
Taking into account economic indicators beyond the crude measure of M3 growth (what the ECB does in its two-pillar-strategy) makes the call for quick further interest hikes rather problematic: While leading indicators point at a rather robust growth momentum in the euro-zone at the moment (thus supporting in principle Prof. Neumann’s position), the outlook is unusually uncertain. Forecasts differ more widely than in any of the past five years, both for the US as well as the euro-zone.
At the external side, we do not know yet how the crash of residential construction in the US will play out. While there are good arguments why the US economy might avoid an outright recession, it seems certain now that there is a significant growth-slowdown at least until the spring of 2007 in the cards.
Add to this the fiscal tightening decided on in Germany and Italy for the beginning of 2007 (again, we do not know how the German economy will take the VAT rise from 16 to 19 percent, depriving the German consumer of roughly one percent of GDP), and the weakness of the French corporate sector (according to first estimates, the French economy stagnated in Q3) and there might be a number of reasons why forecasters might not only underestimate growth for 2007, but might also err to the upside.
Thus, it is only prudent of the ECB not to commit to quick further interest rate hikes, but to wait until some more economic data is available early next year – especially as wage growth in the euro-zone hitting a eight-year-low in Q3 does not hint at fundamental inflationary pressure from the cost side.

















