The German Presidency of the European Union –A British Perspective

By: William E .Paterson, University of Birmingham

The German EU Presidency occurs at a particularly interesting juncture in UK-German relations where the dying fall of the Blair Premiership coincides with the EU Presidency of Angela Merkel. In the abstract the combination of the UK’s most European Prime Minister since Edward Heath (the sole pro-European Labour PM) and a new pragmatic German Chancellor should be a potent force in the EU. This would be, however, to ignore the terminally weakened position of Prime Minister Blair. Flanked by Chancellor Gordon Brown who has uniquely dominated domestic politics, Blair had from the beginning concentrated especially on foreign and European policy. Despite some successes in his first period in office, his foreign policy legacy is now universally seen to be in almost total ruins and his capacity to affect events fatally weakened (Bulmer –Thomas, 2006). Blair has pursued four central external aims. On transatlantic issues he has wanted the United Kingdom to act as a ‘\bridge\’ between Europe and the United States and his second and potentially contradictory aim was through ultra close alignment to exert influence on United States policy (Wandel durch Annäherung).On the European Union, he has wanted to reverse British isolation in Europe and for Britain to play a leading role in the EU. More profoundly, he aspired to changing British attitudes on the EU and making the British people feel comfortable with the European Union. (Paterson, 2006)

 

Nearly all of these policies ended in complete failure. The greatest disaster was the Iraq Crisis where the United Kingdom was neither able to act as a bridge or to exercise any meaningful influence on the policy of the United States. Prime Minister Blair was able to reverse United Kingdom isolation in the EU but was unable to secure a sustainable co-leadership role for Britain. Moreover while he was occasionally successful in selling Britain to Europe, he expended no effort in selling Europe to Britain despite possessing huge majorities and backed by a Parliamentary Labour Party that was less split on Europe than any previous PLP. This neglect combined with continued UK economic prosperity in contrast to difficulties in the Euro-Area has significantly weakened the already very low popular attachment to the European Union.

 

Prime Minister Blair, who has more often supported conservative contenders for office abroad than those on the left, reposed great hopes in Angela Merkel as an ally of the UK. This chapter will explore the way in which UK expectations have been reduced in relation to Germany as a force for economic reform in the EU  and  concern has increased  about the degree to which discussion about the ECT will dominate the EU agenda rather than concentrating on improving the competitiveness  of the EU.

 

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<h4>Chancellor Merkel  as Hoffnungsträgerin of UK European Policy</h4>

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In the late nineties Prime Minister Blair saw Chancellor Schröder as the key European ally in the realisation of the project for the UK to play a leading role in the EU. They had very good personal relations which were to sour dramatically and irrevocably after Schröder’s re-election in September 2002. Blair had strongly supported Schröder in this election unlike President Chirac who offered support to the CDU/CSU candidate Edmund Stoiber. Blair therefore took it very badly when Schröder cut a deal with Chirac immediately after the election, which effectively put the question of agricultural reform on ice. Relations deteriorated further during the Iraq crisis though Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer maintained a good relationship with Blair. In the run up to the 2005 Federal German Election, Prime Minister Blair entertained unrealistically high hopes about Angela Merkel and in a breach of protocol he met her at the British Embassy in Berlin before his last frosty bilateral with Chancellor Schroeder. (1) Misled by the initial public opinion polls, Blair envisioned a uniquely unconstrained Chancellor Merkel as a key ally of the United Kingdom in EU reform. If Merkel had been able to achieve a resounding victory, then in the UK view she would have been able to reform the German and EU economies in a much more liberal direction, abandon the lock step relationship that Schröder had entered into with President Chirac after 2002 in favour of a close relationship with the UK where economic preferences were assumed to be closer, put the ECT issue further on the back burner and repair Germany’s fractured relations with the United States.

 

Despite her notably liberal speech to the 2003 CDU Dresden Party Conference and the prominent role she assigned to Professor Paul Kirchhof in the 2005 election, it was never unmistakably clear how far she shared the liberal inclinations of Friedrich Merz whom she purged from her front bench team. Even if she had possessed these instincts, it is very debatable as to whether the German semi-sovereign political system would allow the radical change that UK observers who had seen the change Prime Minister Thatcher had wrought in the UK, thought possible. (Green and Paterson, 2005)) It was equally unlikely that Germany would push through consistent liberal economic reforms in the EU (Jeffery and Paterson, 2003). The CDU Electoral Programme, probably the least European Christian Democratic Programme since the foundation of the Federal Republic led the UK government to believe that a Merkel government would be de-europeanised and an alliance could therefore be formed on economic preferences. However, the priority that the Merkel government assigns to the constitutional issue demonstrates its continuing Europeanness. This is in marked contrast to the UK Government whose optimal aspiration for the ECT would be to see it pronounced dead but who would be prepared to countenance a quick and dirty‘ cherry picking’ approach in the interests of a quick fix. A road map culminating in 2009 is difficult as it would coincide with the probable date for the next UK elections. The UK Government is very opposed to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, a strong desiderata of the German government, as it would increase the pressure for a referendum.

 

Finally, Chancellor Merkel repaired relations with the United States administration very quickly. Indeed her conspicuous success in this regard became a problem for British policy makers as it threatened to displace Britain from its treasured role as favourite ally, a position for which Britain had made and continues to make painful sacrifices in Iraq and Afghanistan.

 

Despite the non realisation of the UK Government’s more extravagant hopes of Chancellor Merkel, relations with her on EU matters have been surprisingly good. Initially for the UK as for the United States, the fact that she was not Schröder guaranteed a friendly welcome reminiscent of the manner in which Tony Blair was greeted in 1997 by fellow EU members exhausted by the EU policy of the Major government. The context of the UK Presidency in the second half of 2005 then allowed her to play a very constructive role. Had the referendums in France and the Netherlands on the European Constitutional Treaty not been lost in the preceding May, the UK Presidency  would have been beleaguered and under pressure from a German Government  which was strongly committed to the ECT. A less pressured UK Government  felt confident enough to conclude a deal on the budget which involved a cut in the UK rebate, hitherto the sacred cow of British European policy. Chancellor Merkel played a notably constructive role in the budgetary negotiations including making a German financial contribution. While maintaining good relations with France without being boxed in like Schröder, Chancellor Merkel has been at pains to maintain a good relationship with Britain, an aim which is greatly helped by her calm, unflustered, \'sachlich\' style.

 

 

<h4>The EU Presidency</h4>

 

British opinion has followed with some concern the relatively slow progress of domestic reform under the Grand Coalition and the UK Government entertains the hope that success in the EU and G8 Presidencies would significantly strengthen the domestic authority and future reform capacity of the Chancellor since Germany is seen as a potential ally and Britain has a vital interest in a more unequivocally liberal German economy. Such hopes underestimate the difficult context. Almost everywhere outside Germany, political leadership is in a state of advanced transition or confusion. Crucially the French Presidential and legislature elections will span the end of the German Presidency and Tony Blair is expected to go in May/June .The Netherlands an important constituent of the ECT imbroglio currently has no government and the governments of Central Europe are in an advanced state of confusion. In domestic politics, a single individual, a Thatcher, a Kohl or a Mitterrand can dominate a political system but at the EU level a number of powerful leaders with converging agendas are required if change is to be realised. In a smaller EU this could often be provided by the Franco-German relationship but in an enlarged EU of 27, the Franco-German relationship is simply too narrow. At present there is a very marked weakness in domestic political leadership and there is also an absence of  converging agendas comparable with the mid 80’s or the early 90’s. The increasing frequency of recourse to referenda raises the stakes for political leaders who now have to extend their leadership beyond parliaments and  it was the failure in the Dutch and French referenda that precipitated the present crisis.

 

If the wider context suggests a constrained Presidency, the narrower perspective of the personnel at the head of the German government leads many in the United Kingdom to think that it will nevertheless count as a successful Presidency. Merkel lacks the rhetorical skills of a Blair or a Schröder and this has been a handicap in pushing forward the domestic reform agenda but her analytical ability and calm unflustered style have given her real international authority reinforced by success at the Brussels 2005 Summit. The decision to appoint Christoph Heusgen as foreign policy adviser has helped shorten the learning curve that all new Chancellors must experience. Heusgen has also been a help with establishing good relations with Commission President Barroso and Javier Solana both of whom enjoy the confidence of the UK government. Germany, however, continues to punch below her weight in Brussels and this Presidency has been weakened by the swirl of controversy around Commission Vice President Guenter Verheugen (2). She also works well with the Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, a known quantity in London from his previous role in the Kanzleramt. The signs of recovery in the German economy have increased the authority of the German Government abroad though paradoxically they may complicate the domestic picture by reducing pressure for reform. 

 

UK expectations are in line with a general picture where hopes for the German Presidency are higher abroad than in Germany. There are a number of reasons for this disconnect. Given the parlous state of leadership elsewhere there is a strong impetus to tap into the leadership of a powerful Presidency to realise the aims that enfeebled leaderships are unable to achieve themselves, e.g. the United Kingdom Government places great hopes that the German Government will be able to make significant progress in the environmental field. This is especially important as the two succeeding Presidencies, Slovenia and Portugal are not seen as possessing the same sort of clout. The United Kingdom with a centralised governmental system based on clear majorities has a high leadership expectation and this is reflected in a more heroic view of Presidencies than those countries used to the humdrum nature of coalition negotiation in domestic politics normally entertain.

 

German Presidencies are normally less prone to an expectations/achievement gap. This reflects an appreciable difference in the styles of London and Berlin. Given a highly centralised machinery of government, a revisionist position on key core EU issues and weak domestic political support for the EU, British governments usually announce their Presidency goals in heroic terms and a long time in advance and then  seek to persuade other members. Less driven by the need to satisfy a domestic audience and with a centralist position on most EU issues, the German style is to consult heavily with other partners, traditionally with France and only to reveal the presidency plans at a late stage. This tendency is heightened by the decentralised nature of German government and the fact that, as at present, coalitions are the norm.

 

 

<h4>The ECT Imbroglio</h4>

 

If the Presidency Programme has an overall self- modesty about its aspirations, there is one huge exception. The great overhanging rock of this Presidency is the fate of the ECT rejected in the Dutch and French  referenda. Whereas Germany traditionally was very skilful in placing itself at the centre of constitutive bargains usually in tandem with France and waiting till the issue was ready for decision (\'entscheidungsreif\'), on this occasion Germany has taken a maximalist position in favour of the Treaty as a starting point rather than burying it as a number of member states including the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic and to a degree France and the Netherlands would prefer. The taking-up of a definite position on a controversial issue at the beginning of negotiations and then arguing strongly for it is a Presidency style more British than conventionally German. It has declared a strong preference for completion of the ratification process and constantly stresses that the Treaty has been ratified by eighteen states. Germany itself is in the embarrassing position where it has been adopted by both the Bundestag and Bundesrat but the Federal Constitutional Court has postponed its decision on the legality of the Treaty until it has been ratified in every member state (Maurer and Schwarzer, 2006). Given the failure in referenda in two key original member states, strong reservations among a number of the remaining five, the absence of a Dutch government and the fact that the French elections occur late in the Presidency cycle this is a fairly exposed position to adopt.

 

In pursuing a maximalist strategy the German government will be flanked by the Spanish government, which has been very active in mobilising the eighteen to put pressure on others. The German government’s own strategy involves an imaginative use of a declaration to be known as the Berlin Declaration to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaty of Rome. This is to be an account of what the EU has achieved with the intention that it could be used to counteract the popular dissatisfaction which led to rejection in France and the Netherlands. The argument being that the profound achievements of the EU are now taken for granted and displaced by passing but powerful irritations. In France, at least, one of the factors advanced for the failure of the ECT was the exclusion of the clause on social issues and it is hoped that this focus will be clear in the Berlin Declaration, though this will also be balanced by a commitment to economic liberalisation. Finally, the Declaration will hope to reach a consensus on European values, a tricky area when even inside the Federal Government there is no consensus on their relevance in relation to Russia and other areas.

 

Investing the Berlin Declaration with the degree of significance the German Presidency has assigned to it carries risks. The Presidency wants to do more than scope the nature of the consensus-at present there is none. It wants to pressure both those states where there has been a popular rejection of the ECT and reluctant states like Britain towards adoption of as much of the treaty text as possible. Foreign Minister Steinmeier has suggested that \"some EU member states have to move more than others\" to reach a compromise between those who have already ratified the Treaty and those who have not so far responded or whose public has rejected it (Steinmeier, 2006). Putting pressure on France before the elections and on the Netherlands where there is currently no government and where the PvDA (Dutch Labour Party) have declared their opposition to the Constitution may well be counter productive and Minister Steinmeier’s view that those member states who have not already ratified the Treaty could feel more responsible for providing a solution to the ratification crisis seems over-optimistic (Steinmeier, 2006). Tweaking the Treaty in a more social direction to satisfy assumed French anxieties would significantly complicate relations with the UK.

 

Another danger is that in excluding ‘cherry picking‘, the Presidency will fail to make achievable advances in areas like CFSP/ESDP, e.g. the position of a European Foreign Minister since this would cut across the attempt to put pressure on other member states for a maximal solution. This same concern also explains why the Presidency has been reticent at this stage in bringing forward specific proposals or responding to proposals by others like the Sarkozy proposal for a mini treaty though here Chancellor Merkel stressed that there was ‘no insuperable conflict ‘ with his proposal (Merkel, 2006).

 

To some extent the German Presidency is sending out mixed messages as both advocate and mediator. Unusually, there is not and cannot be a Franco-German position before the French elections but Germany has staked out a strong advocacy position on the ECT before and in the early period of the Presidency and  suggested further that those states that have not ratified the ECT have a special obligation to contribute to the solution. This despite the fact that the issue is anything but \'entscheidungsreif\'. By contrast the road map metaphor suggests mediation. The risks would be that too strong an espousal of the advocacy role would cut across the mediation role and that the final result might be seen as disappointingly modest in the context of the initial position.

 

In looking at this issue it is useful to keep the gardener metaphor in mind. This Presidency gardener metaphor focuses on the short season available. The Presidency as gardener has to pay careful attention to the soil (political context) and to spend a great deal of time watering and fertilising (mediation). In the current Presidency all these indicators suggest a modest outcome. In a post enlargement Europe characterised by a shrinking core and an expanding periphery the former model where the Franco-German duo would present a joint bouquet raised in their own special Franco-German hothouse to admiring fellow members is passé. Given their restricted time frame, it is best to regard the Presidency as an opportunity for planting seeds rather than harvesting and that must be the hope of the German Presidency in relation to the road map and the attempt to keep as much of the ECT alive as possible. What remains to be seen is whether the aspiration to keep as much ECT as possible will best be achieved by pressurising other member states (advocacy role) or mediation at which German governments generally and Angela Merkel in particular excel.

 

On most other issues of the Presidency the United Kingdom will be an ally of Germany. It will support the Presidency proposal to reduce bureaucracy, which echoes the efforts of the UK Presidency to improve regulation. There is also a great deal of common ground on environmental proposals and the UK is likely to support proposals for a climate change regime being prepared by the German Presidency. Completing the single market on energy has long been a UK priority, and the UK government also welcomes initiatives on energy security. There is a perennial UK regret that the German government’s support for the Lisbon process is insufficiently active. There is also a differing emphasis on how to deal with Russia where the UK takes a slightly harder line on the renegotiation of the PAC. The UK government is concerned about the increasingly authoritarian cast of Putin’s Russia , its unhelpful stance on Iran and the actions of the Russian government vis-à-vis foreign oil giants some of which are British. President Putin’s habit of cultivating bilateral alliances with favoured partners inside the EU, notably Germany, has left Britain feeling excluded and resentful.

 

In the general area of European foreign policy there have been moves over recent years to an increased leadership role for the ‘big three’, Britain, France and Germany, and more long term this trend is likely to continue (Hill, 2006). The prospects for further development in the German Presidency are likely to be bedevilled by leadership issues in France and Britain. The French Presidential and Parliamentary Elections will preclude a very active role for France. In the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Blair continues to regard the Middle East, despite all that has transpired as a chasse gardee  for himself and this will be an obstacle to the development of an EU position. On Central Asia, an important area for the German Presidency there is also some division with Britain siding with the United States to block a Franco-German-Russian proposal that Kazakhstan be Chair of the OSCE. On other issues like Kosovo the UK is closer to the German Presidency.

 

<h4>Conclusion</h4>

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Prime Minister Blair has long since written off President Chirac but after the UK Presidency he hoped  that this German Presidency would see a close UK-German alignment. On the UK side, the resolution of the budget issue in December 2005 took the UK out of a fixed defensive position and rendered it a potential ally. This hope, which was always a little unrealistic, was dashed by the result of the Federal Election which further constrained the degree to which the Presidency could push the reform agenda. Beyond that contingent explanation , German European policy has still too strong a European vocation reflected in the constitutionalising imperative to make alignment possible and had the ECT treaty not been rejected in two member states then the disconnect between the German and UK positions would  have appeared even stronger. (3)

 

Chancellor Merkel has talked of a re-founding (\'Neubegründung\') of the EU which would close the gap between public and elite sentiment mercilessly exposed in the ECT referenda disasters (\'Regierungerklärung\', 2006) She has however made little progress in crafting a narrative to serve that aim and the content of the re-foundation remains vague and fuzzy and it is unlikely that this Presidency will reveal the precise contours of this vision. To understand why this is the case, a comparison with PM Thatcher and Helmut Kohl is instructive. If we take will, means and model as a template, we can see that Mrs Thatcher had the will in EU policy but lacking allies except on the Single European Act she was rarely able to achieve her aims. She had, however, a very clear model in mind which was to upload the model of political economy she had fashioned in the UK to the European level. Post Thatcher there has been continuity in the political economy of the UK, which is then projected into EU negotiations. It does not command a majority in the EU but no one is any doubt about the clarity of the vision and is likely to be pursued even more single-mindedly by a Gordon Brown or David Cameron than it was by Tony Blair (4).

 

Helmut Kohl certainly had the will and he also had the means through the Franco-German partnership, the circle of Christian Democratic leaders and the economic resources and prestige which was associated with what was still regarded as a massively powerful economy. There was also relative clarity about the model given the continued prestige of the German model and the German government was able \'to shape the regional milieu\' by exporting key institutions like the model for the ECB (Bulmer, Jeffery Paterson, 2000). Chancellor Merkel has the will but lacks the means given the lack of traction of the Franco-German partnership in the new enlarged Europe and reduced financial resources. The most crucial impediment is however uncertainty about the model. My argument is that European policy is clearest when it is uploading clear national preferences based on its political economy model. The decline of the German model as an object of emulation clearly constrains the government. It is also a coalition government. At the Auswärtiges Amt Presidency launch Conference in Berlin on 29/30^th November there was a strong call for more emphasis on the Lisbon Agenda by the State Secretary from the Economics Ministry who was partnered by the State Secretary from the Labour Ministry who made an equally strong plea for a more social Europe. In a government like that in the United Kingdom governed by collective responsibility these positions would have been reconciled but there was no sign at all of any attempt in this direction. Crucially, Chancellor Merkel, as has been already observed is not unambiguous in her support of liberalism. In seeking to \'re-found Europe\', to bring it closer to the people and demonstrate its benefits there is a choice to be made between a \'social Europe\', which seeks to protect the status quo and a more liberal vision which assumes that long term employment will be better created by adjusting to globalisation. There is little sign that the Grand Coalition and Chancellor Merkel are ready to make that choice and until there is that readiness German European policy will not be re-founded which of course does not exclude it being successful from time to time given that this condition is shared with most member states of the European Union. It does, however, exclude a settled partnership on European policy with  the government of the United Kingdom.

 

      Footnotes:

 

(1) Schröder was to take his revenge by insisting that it was his right rather than Merkel’s to attend the Hampton Court Conference of the UK Presidency where he was spectacularly unhelpful to his British host, Tony Blair

(2) This controversy was engendered by Verheugen’s attack on Commission officials as ‘over mighty’ and his indiscretions with his chef de cabinet, Petra Erler. Curiously Germany has rarely enjoyed huge clout in Brussels. In the Hallstein and Delors Presidencies there was a strong strategic relationship but these Presidencies were exceptional. Germany has with very few exceptions sent Commissioners of not very inspiring calibre; perhaps a function of the need in Germany to fill 16 Laender governments and the Federal Constitutional Court. Unlike France and the UK German governments do not place a great emphasis on getting their nationals into key posts in the Commission

 

(3) For an extended discussion of whether Germany still has a European vocation See W.E.Paterson: Does Germany Still have a European Vocation?

 

European Research Working Paper Series,2006, No 15 Available at ERI website www.eri.bham.ac.uk/research/WP15Paterson

 

(4) Blair has been a huge disappointment to pro Europeans in the UK given the disconnect between his rhetoric and delivery on policy. On Blair’s Europeanness, one is inclined to echo De Gaulle who observed of Brazil that it had great potential and  always would have.

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