We use cookies to help improve and maintain our site. More information.
close

June 08, 2020

Brexit talks at an impasse

The current Brexit negotiations are at an impasse, unsurprisingly. Both sides started with the usual dance, and serious talks will not start until those who set the negotiating mandates give new instructions. Boris Johnson will soon face a choice among three options: extend; not extend and try for a deal by October; not extend, stop negotiating and prepare for no-deal. It is hard to say what will happen. At the moment, the picture is very dark. There are many obstacles despite some hints of willingness to compromise on both sides. One of the latest roadblocks, as reported by the Guardian, had been opposition from fisheries ministers to a potential compromise currently under discussion. We still don't think this will fail because of fish, but we are still in a phase where the small intersection of the interests of the EU27 member states does not itself intersect the interests of the UK. The political brinkmanship needed to find a compromise is enormous. And the EU is currently busy with two mega-projects: managing the end of the lockdown, and the EU budget negotiations. Accidents are possible, and maybe even intended.

On Friday, the latest round of negotiations ended with no result. The EU and the UK have wasted four months. We don't think Johnson will extend. So, if there is a deal, it will have to be done by October. We think this is possible, but this can only involve a small trade deal initially, assuming a readiness by both sides to drop some of their red lines. The problem is that both sides have persuaded themselves that they can live without a deal. They both will have to rein in their extremists. 

The UK is now proposing a very small deal with some tariffs on agricultural products. That's a new variant. But it, too, is complicated. We think the overall idea of a small deal is right. The best way forward in our view is a framework deal, time-limited or with a review clause, based on zero tariffs, zero quotas, and hard level-playing field commitments but with no obligation by the UK to follow future EU rules. This way, it will become apparent very soon that the UK is not going to undermine competition through state aid, an issue we consider a red herring. 

We heard reports that Michel Barnier is willing to compromise on state aid rules, which is encouraging. The UK wants the right to sponsor new industries without the EU frustrating it. This is not about car subsidies. The EU has a bigger state-aid problem with Germany than it will ever have with the UK.

Wolfgang Münchau takes a closer look at the most-favoured-nation tariffs the UK has recently proposed, and which will enter into force next year. The key is that MFN tariffs by the UK will fall from an 7.2% currently to 5.7% on average. This is miles away from universal free trade. The 10% car tariffs, for example, will stay. But the elimination of tariffs on many product groups, like dishwashers and freezers, means that the trade negotiations will have to deal with complex rules-of-origin problems. If the EU applies a tariff on a product but the UK does not, third-country exporters might try to route their products through the UK into the EU. This is why a zero-tariff, zero-quota trade deal is easier when the tariff schedules are broadly aligned. But they are not. As the economy struggles after the lockdown, EU industry will ask for protection. 

And finally, Andrew Rawnsley tells us in his Observer column that Rishi Sunak, the UK's finance minister and once an enthusiastic Brexiteer, has become more careful about no-deal. He quotes some Tories who believe Johnson is bluffing. He desperately wants a deal, but wants to take the EU to the brink. We are not sure this is true, but we think this would be a bad idea. The EU is quite good at sussing this out. If you play hard, you really need to be willing to walk out.

Show Comments Write a Comment

June 08, 2020

Trump's troop reduction in Germany - another way to divide the EU?

Donald Trump ordered a reduction in the US troop presence in Germany by another 9500 soldiers, and imposed an upper limit of 25,000. This news reported by the Wall Street Journal last Friday is yet to be confirmed officially. But, if true, it would add to the complications in the Germany-US relationship. The move was criticised by Colin Powell and former US generals, who warned that this is not embedded in any strategy and weakens the US' leadership role in the world. Heiko Maas, the German foreign minister, admits that relations are complicated. He alluding to frictions such as the nuclear deal with Iran, Berlin's support for the NordStream 2 pipeline, or the tensions between the US government and its European Nato allies. 

It is a fact that nowhere else outside the US are there more US soldiers stationed than in Germany. It is the base for their operations in the Middle East and Africa. In Germany the US army has its largest weapon depot and air force base outside the US. It is not that troop reduction is unprecedented. The US has been reducing its troops in Germany over the past 30 years. The biggest reduction was after German reunification. The contingent fell from 228,000 in 1990 to 75,000 in 2002. 

It is the politics of Trump's move that is deeply worrying. Where will the soldiers go? Home, or will they perhaps move closer to Nato's eastern border? Poland has been lobbying to get more US soldiers on its ground for years now, and it will do what it can to gain from this move. The Polish government prides itself in its good connections to Trump. It promised to invest €2bn into a new base and even to name it Fort Trump, all this to please the US president. There is a strong political consensus in the country in favour of a greater US presence. Germany's reluctance to increase defence spending, and the SPD's recent criticism about hosting US nuclear weapons, have been seized by Poland. Geor­get­te Mosba­cher, US ambassador to Poland, tweeted last week that, if Germany is to weaken Nato, Poland could step in and take over the nuclear weapons. This just shows how Poland's fixation on Trump could end up dividing EU partners. It also raises fundamental questions for Nato. If US troops were permanently relocated to Nato's eastern flank, this would have a significant impact on the Nato-Russia founding act of 1997, which restricted the permanent deployment of Nato troops in the former Warsaw Pact countries, writes FAZ.

Show Comments Write a Comment

This is the public section of the Eurointelligence Professional Briefing, which focuses on the geopolitical aspects of our news coverage. It appears daily at 2pm CET. The full briefing, which appears at 9am CET, is only available to subscribers. Please click here for a free trial, and here for the Eurointelligence home page.

 

Recent News

  • September 21, 2020
  • Forget soft power
  • September 08, 2020
  • Why you should not trust the media on Brexit
  • August 27, 2020
  • Forget the E3. UK's foreign policy already realigning
  • France and Germany - good cop, bad cop towards Turkey?
  • August 17, 2020
  • How Putin could divide the EU over Belarus
  • The impossible mission of forming a federal government in Belgium
  • July 23, 2020
  • The geopolitical storm over Huawei hits Europe
  • Hagia Sophia - Erdogan's political gamble
  • July 14, 2020
  • Why the far-right might win in the end
  • July 06, 2020
  • Did Covid-19 escape from a Wuhan lab?
  • What to make of Angela Merkel's U-turn
  • June 29, 2020
  • Édouard Philippe - mayor or prime minister?
  • Sir Humphrey, R.I.P.
  • June 23, 2020
  • EU-China relations - another Waiting for Godot moment
  • Troop movements on the German-Polish border
  • June 19, 2020
  • Green policies get a boost from recovery efforts
  • Small Countries, small problems. Austria ready to compromise on recovery fund over Schnitzel
  • June 15, 2020
  • US and Germany step up fight over NordStream 2
  • Macron's agenda for the next two years
  • June 11, 2020
  • Europe needs to re-engage in Libya
  • Who should succeed Centeno?
  • June 09, 2020
  • The EU and the re-emergence of the state
  • This is not 1968.
  • June 08, 2020
  • Brexit talks at an impasse
  • Trump's troop reduction in Germany - another way to divide the EU?