20 August 2024
How the war will end
I have no idea when the war in Ukraine will end, but I think I can make an educated guess of how it will end. It will be similar to the recent prisoner exchange between Russia and the West.
That deal came out of the blue. It was the work of quiet diplomacy. The West secured the release of 16 prisoners, mostly westerners, including the US journalist Evan Gershkovich. Vladimir Putin got his favourite contract killer, Vadim Krasikov, released from a German jail. In 2019, Krasikov killed Zelimkhan Khangoshvili, a former head of a combat troop of Chechnian rebels, who later worked for the Georgian intelligence services for whom he identified Russian spies. The German court that convicted Krasikov said it was a fact that Krasikov acted on behalf of the Russian government. It was not entirely clear why Putin wanted Krasikov released, but it was clear he wanted him badly.
The diplomacy to end the war will take longer, but it, too, will happen quietly and secretly, and it will come as a shock to Ukraine’s supporters in the West, some of whom may still believe that Ukraine can achieve total victory, including the liberation of Crimea, maybe even regime change in Russia itself. The problem for Ukraine has been that its Western supporters do not have a commonly agreed war goal.
The war in Ukraine will end when both sides realise the cost of continued fighting will exceed the benefits. We are not at this point yet. Russian troops have pushed further into Ukrainian territory in the last couple of months, albeit realising only modest gains.
Ukraine’s offensive into the Russian border region of Kursk constitutes an interesting twist. It is a risky manoeuvre. If successful, it could lead to a re-direction of Russian troops away from the frontline in Ukraine. It may give Ukraine a bargaining chip during peace negotiations. But I struggle to see how Ukraine can recapture Russian occupied territories, just as I struggle to see how Russia can occupy more Ukrainian territories beyond a few villages here and there.
The Kursk invasion was without a doubt a morale booster. Ukraine now attracts some positive news headlines. But this war is not going to won by a stunt. What is unlikely to improve is the slowly but steadily progressing Ukraine-support fatigue in countries like the US and Germany. I am not even sure that the outcome of the US elections would make much as much difference. Once we enter year three of the war, with the battlelines largely unchanged, a lot of people in the west will want this to end, not only the Putin fans of the far-right. Unless one of the sides achieves a military breakthrough, the scepticism will grow.
One of the reasons for lagging western support are economic. The support Ukraine is competing with domestic spending. Military budgets are tight everywhere. The price of gas has started to rise again on energy markets because of the critical role played by the Kursk oblast in delivering Russian gas to Europe. Ukraine has occupied the Kursk town of Sudzha, which is located close to where Russian gas enters the Ukrainian pipeline network. When the Nord Stream Baltic Sea pipelines were blown up two years ago, the Ukrainian gas continued to flow through the Sudzha transit point. Ukraine also operates large gas storage facilities on which western European heavily relies on for its own supplies. There is a vulnerability for Europe is these gas supplies are cut off. Both sides are now attacking each other’s energy infrastructure.
Western economic sanctions have failed to increase the pressure on Russia to quit. Its economy has outperformed those of the west. I have been warning against overestimating the effects of economic sanctions right from the start because the Eurasian continent is large, and its multiple trade routes are hard to control. China, India and Russia have deepened their strategic alliance. Russia procures weapons from North Korea and Iran.
But Russia’s resources are also not infinite. Right now, Russia is benefitting from a war economy effect. That will eventually wear off. While I do not think it would be a good idea to challenge Putin to an economic endurance game, we should also not draw the opposite conclusion that Putin will want to fight forever. If there is no fundamental shift in the military situation by next year, there would really be no point for him continue this war. The same goes for Ukraine too.
President Volodymyr Zelenski says he will accept nothing but a total Russian withdrawal. Russian wants four Ukrainian oblasts. International law fully support the position of Ukraine, but this is war will not be settled in the courts. From a military perspective, both sides’ stated goals appear unrealistic. My baseline scenario is that they will agree somewhere in the middle, maybe next year. There is still a lot to play for, but nobody will get everything they want. It will be a deal that will have no winners, yet one that allows both sides to claim victory. It will be a dirty deal, unleashed on the world as a fait accompli, like a prisoner exchange.
The column first appeared in the New Statesman magazine.
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