Europe’s sudden rush to raise defence spending distracts us from asking more pertinent strategic long-term questions. What is our goal for the post-war era with both Ukraine and Russia? And what strategy would be best to get us there?

Europe has an objective – that Ukraine must win whatever it takes. But Europe lacks a strategy of how to achieve this objective, and certainly no strategy for what happens afterwards. It is good to see Mark Rutte, the Nato general secretary, say that Europe should eventually think about normalising relations with Russia. “Let's not be naive about the Russians. But in the longer term, Russia is there, and Russia will not go away,” he said. He got a lot of abuse for that, but he said something that needed to be said, something Europe is still in denial of.  

Let’s think for a moment what would happen if the Europeans get their way, and let this hopeless war continue. Russia is resourceful enough to drag this war out and with it our patience and resources. Russia defied our sanctions, and our predictions already. If all our actions are about sending weapons to Ukraine, this will not end the war any time soon. Emmanuel Macron and Keir Starmer are even talking about sending troops to the Ukrainian borders with Russia. From Russia’s point of view, this would be considered as a Nato involvement and raise the stakes in this war dramatically.  Is this their strategy to escalate as a way to force Russia to peace negotiations? But what kind of peace is this going to be? How long is this peace by force to last until it is tested again?

Peace needs a long-term prospect for both, Ukraine and Russia. We have a long list of promises ready for Ukraine including its reconstruction and EU membership. What about Russia after the conflict?  What would a peaceful relation with Russia look like? What can Europe offer Russia as an alternative to its war economy? Russia with its vast resources of raw materials has plenty to offer to the raw material poor Europe. We do not have to repeat the mistake of making ourselves dependent by relying solely on Russian gas. But Europe could benefit from a diversity of suppliers with Russia. Energy could become big again. For this to happen Europe would have to recalibrate its positions towards Russia and Ukraine.

This long-term perspective is missing in the current debate. Instead we primarily focus on the military and thus only on one aspect. The deterrence quality of defence can be useful to diplomacy in negotiations. But military spending does not substitute diplomatic strategies. Focussing on defence without a diplomatic strategy that can offer a long-term perspective is likely to result in more war not less. And there is a risk of overdoing it. As long as the war goes on in Ukraine, we are likely to exaggerate the potential threat from Russia for EU countries. It is like a break-in into one of the houses in your street, after which you feel more at risk of a burglary in your house even if crime statistics suggest otherwise. Similarly, we find that the implicit assumption in EU’s positions is that after Ukraine, EU countries would be next on Russia’s hit list. This is a fallacy of composition. A defence strategy needs to be prepared for all eventualities. But we are focussing on the worst-case scenario only and not building the case for a positive outcome at all.

The defence case also is not as straightforward as politicians suggest. More is not always better. Emmanuel Macron suggested that France and all other European countries should aim for a 3% of GDP target for their defence spending. These numerical targets follow the same logic as the 3% deficit and debt-to-GDP targets for fiscal policy, making everyone pay and preventing free riders. But spending targets won’t make European defence more functional, the same as they did not make fiscal policy more efficient. And just because defence spending will be excluded from the EU’s deficit rule, it does not mean one has to spend it all.  The wars of tomorrow are fought with drones not tanks, which come with a completely different price tag. By investing in what is needed in Ukraine, we would prepare for this kind of war, but not for the one in the future.

France has a major role to play in EU defence as the only nuclear power within the EU. Its nuclear deterrence is independent of the US, technically as well as politically. France could extend the nuclear shield to other EU countries. The current doctrine already does so implicitly, if it is in France’s own vital interest. That is what French presidents have been committed to since Charles de Gaulle. Discussions about how to extend the nuclear shield more explicitly are already in the making. And as long as we are not trying to move the decision making to Brussels, there should also be little cost involved.

Finally, let’s not forget how the EU started: After two world wars the European Steel and Coal Community was created as a project of peace through economic cooperation. Why not use this principle to formulate a strategy that promotes a post-war peace strategy for Ukraine and Russia?

Whether we like it or not, Russia remains our neighbour. But if we keep on doubling down on defence without diplomacy, we end up heading for a war nobody can win, with no prospects of a lasting peace.