After the first visit of a Syrian president with a US president in the Oval office in Washington, another first of its kind happened in the Elysee palace in Paris, where Emmanuel Macron welcomed Mahmoud Abbas officially as the president of Palestine.

This is shift that became possible after France recognised the Palestinian state in September this year. Together, Macron and Abbas agreed to set up a joint panel to consolidate the State of Palestine and drafting a Palestinian constitution. The work is to cover all legal aspects of statehood including constitutional, institutional and organisational.

France remains firmly committed to the two-state solution and is with Spain one of the only two large EU countries to recognise Palestinian statehood. The Trump peace plan remains deliberately vague on this issue and was agreed without involving the Palestinians. The Trump plan is, however, the operational blueprint that Israel and Muslim States signed up for. The process is still in phase one, with difficult negotiations on moving to the next phase. Will it ever get to phase two? The situation on the ground suggests that Hamas resumed control over half of Gaza while Israel is proceeding to annex further land in the West Bank. Violence and destruction is continuing despite the ceasefire.

In this context, the move of Macron and Abbas brings no guarantee that their work will ever be implemented. They proceed, nevertheless. The Trump plan is in favour of a technocratic Palestinian government, supervised by an international task force and Trump himself. But without a Palestinian partner, this plan cannot take off. France’s position has been that despite its weakness, the Palestinian Authority is the only possible partner but neither Israel nor the US administration are in favour.

The meeting between Macron and Abbas was an act of defiance against side-lining the PLO in the peace plan in the hope that Washington will one day see that there is no other way out of the impasse. This is Macron’s foreign policy gamble, and a daring one too without the means to impose it. The work will require patience, preparing for a day when the world would be ready to receive it or offer a better alternative.

Ahmed al-Sharaa is the first Syrian president ever to visit the US president in the oval office. It is a risky bet by Donald Trump, who counts Syria as one of his key successes in the region. Donald Trump hailed Al-Sharaa as a tough guy coming from a tough region.

Al-Sharaa's visit would have been impossible without his backers: Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar. They will be responsible for making sure that Trump’s bet pays off and that Al-Sharaa succeeds to unite and rebuild Syria after 13 years of civil war and join the anti-terrorism alliance. Can these states succeed to establish stability in Syria? The experiences in Iraq, Yemen, Sudan or Libya are cautionary tales for the critics.

The Trump administration had hoped to present a security deal between Syria and Israel during the meeting. Trump’s dream is that eventually Syria would be integrated into the Abraham accords. The next steps will be crucial to define how this can be achieved.

Al-Sharaa insists on one independent nation. But what exactly does this mean? Syria is a historic, multi-ethnic and multi-religious society, bordering with Lebanon in the west and Iraq in the east and Turkey to the north. Al-Sharaa depends on Turkey and US for delivering on his security pledges. A one-nation approach needs internal integration. Whether the Kurds can be integrated into the Syrian Army will be key to its success, as well as what will happen to the regions of Suweyda and Daraa in the south. Israeli troops consider them to be a buffer zone, and as a guaranteed access to the minority Druze community that Israel seeks to protect.

Syrian and US forces have already carried out five joint operations against ISIS terrorist groups with some success, according to Haaretz. Yet for Syria to take over control, it needs to build up its military leadership, prevent extremist infiltration, and show its capacity to rein in militias. There are reports of renewed ISIS activity with some thousand fighters. This front will continue to be a threat to Al-Sharaa and his vision for Syria.

The security arrangements with Israel could not be finalised during Al-Sharaa’s meeting with Trump. There were suggestions that the US could establish a military base near Damascus to oversee the implementation of a demilitarisation zone in the south of the capital and along Syria’s borders towards Lebanon in the West and Jordan in the South. Damascus denied these reports, but even if true, it is not clear how to address Israel’s relationship with the Druzes. Another crucial point for Israel is for Al-Sharaa to prevent Hezbollah in Lebanon from getting their weapons through Syria, the only route there is from Iran.

The challenge to rebuild this war torn country is massive. The World Bank estimates that it will cost $300bn to rebuild. Currently there are pledges of some $28bn from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey. But that money will only flow once the US sanctions are lifted. This applies in particular to the sanctions under the Caesar act, which prohibits any aid or investment in Syria. The US Senate already voted to repeal the Act, but the House of Representatives still needs to approve. Syria not only needs money, but also legislation that adhere to international standards to allow more investment to flow into Syria.

Somewhere between the dream of independence and this reality lies al-Sharaa’s path. But there is also an understanding that Syria cannot be allowed to fail. Hence the collective efforts to turn this into a success story.

Here at Eurointelligence, we have often used the expression: from complacency to panic. Complacency is the defining characteristic of many European politicians, and almost a prerequisite for political success in some European countries. The story gets interesting when that complacency hits limits of reality and logic. It is happening in Germany right now.

Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the German president, has effectively called for a ban of the AfD. His old party, the SPD, is in terminal decline. Its decline is easy to see in electoral results, but in the centres of power in Berlin, it has been overshadowed by the party's relative success. It had two chancellors in the last 25 years, and has been part of coalition government every year since 1998, except for four. The party is polling at 15%. It is the party of pensioners and welfare recipients. It is hard to see why it is declining. 

The German establishment is not used to losing. What bad losers with a low IQ do everywhere is start to point fingers. The polls have the AfD at a firm level of 26%, up from 22% in the last elections. There are signs of a cyclical economic upswing, but none that will bring lasting joy.

The most likely consequence of Steinmeier’s comments is to drive more voters into the hands of the AfD. Once you go after your opponents through the legal system, this is when you start to lose. It happened in the US. It is happening in France. Vladimir Putin is a politician who bans opposition parties. But he controls the legal system. If you are trying to play this game in a country like Germany, you will fail.

A political ban is hard to do in Germany. The Constitutional Court only ever banned two parties: the Sozialistische Reichspartei Deutschlands in 1952, a Nazi party, and the Communist Party in 1956. In both of those cases the constitutional argument was clear cut. These were parties that would not have allowed free elections had they won power. The procedure to ban the far-right NPD failed, despite the fact that this party was de facto a neo-Nazi party. The AfD also has members with far-right views, but it does not meet the criteria for a ban. It's not even close. The German constitutions sets a high bar. It is not enough to conclude that certain policies may violate the Constitution. What matters is that the party, once in power, respects constitutional rule.

So if you want to beat the AfD, you will have to do this yourself in elections. Politicians like Steinmeier do not know how to do this, and in their desperation end up driving more voters away.

Will Alexis Tsipras and Antonis Samaras launch a comeback to politics with their own parties? In Greek politics it is an unspoken rule that former prime ministers do not comment on current politics. But Tsipras and Samaras defied this rule and are now openly flirting with the idea of forming new parties.

Both men were leading figures during the bailout years of the Greek debt crisis. Samaras was prime minister between 2012 and 2015, Tsipras directly after him between 2015 and 2019. Both experienced a meteoric rise to power, followed by a period of political decline. Both are now considering a return to frontline politics.

In the case of Tsipras, this is also a story of the demise of Syriza. The left-wing party has gone from being Greece's main opposition force to sitting at only 4% in the polls after dramatic infighting and split-offs when Stefanos Kasselakis, an outsider from Florida, won the leadership elections in 2023. Eventually Kasselakis left the party to form his own. There are now four main split-off parties that stem from disagreements with Syriza's leadership since 2015.

Tsipras recently confirmed rumours that he intends to form a new party. He announced his resignation from Syriza in October and told the left-wing newspaper Efimerida ton Syntakton that he wants a reorganisation of a progressive opposition. Is this just another party in the already fragmented political landscape? This is perhaps more than just that. Tsipras could garner 20% on the left, a recent poll suggests.

Tsipras is now openly breaking the silence with a new biography to be launched this month. According to the Deutsche Welle, he has a lot to say about Angela Merkel in this book. He also started to comment on current Greek politics.

Samaras has a an altogether different story. His former party, New Democracy, is still leading in the polls under Kyriakos Mitsotakis, despite the many misgivings there are. Samaras has been a notorious critic of the party and was expelled in late 2024 by Mitsotakis. Since then Samaras doubled down on his fundamental criticism and in favour of a patriotic party under his own leadership. These pressures are building up, and suggest that it is not a question of whether but when he will form this new party. In a recent interview with ANT1, Samaras said that he is considering calmly the idea insisting that the country needs a new beginning with a new national vision and a battle of ideas not management. Could Samaras unite the right to hard-right on nationalist issues? Would he lure votes away from New Democracy? Not clear. But a new party further to the right means more pressure on Mitsotakis’s government.

If those two leaders from the bailout years were to succeed with their comeback, we expect the re-emergence of some of the divisive points during their premiership to re-emerge too, be it on Turkey or troika austerity. 

The ultra fast-fashion retailer platform Shein is a showcase for how tensions can quickly escalate between Europe and China. Shein, originally from Guangzhou but operating from Singapore, has been in the crosshairs of the French authorities after the discovery of sex dolls representing little girls and firearms on their platform.

Shein has since removed those products from its website, now showing only its own brand rather than the vast marketplace for toys, homeware and gadgets that it increasingly made money with. Its CEO assured that they will fully cooperate. The timing is quite remarkable, the story hit the news cycle just when Shein opened its first department store in Paris. It also comes amid tensions over anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations between China and the EU.

The French government’s response was heavy-handed. Yesterday, they launched a large scale inspection operation of packages arriving at Paris airports and initiated several proceedings against Shein. The first was giving the online retailers 48 hours to comply with regulations. The retailer has to comply with the L521-3 of the  Commercial Code and Art. 6-3 of the law for confidence in the digital economy to operate in France. Under these procedures, the worst that can happen is that Shein is delisted. This means in practice that the site’s pages won’t appear in online searches on Google or other search engines. But access is still available by typing in their URL. A parallel procedure was launched by the interior ministry with a threat to block the site for serious damage to public order. This goes further and would require internet service providers to block access to the site almost immediately.

At the European level, the French launched a third procedure, asking the European Commission to investigate Shein’s compliance with the Digital Services Act. A European investigation would be more serious with penalties that could reach up to 6% of global turnover. It could allow EU member states to block the platform if a systemic risk was identified.

Shein has become a symbol of China’s aggressive export strategies. With nearly 146m of monthly users in the EU according to its latest DSA report, the retailer is swamping the European market with cheap products arriving in millions of small parcels. Shein and other platforms benefit from the EU waiver exempting parcels below €150 in value from customs duties.

Not adhering to the EU’s regulatory standards also helps lower the price. Germany's Stiftung Warentest found that 110 out of 162 tested items from Shein and Temu did not meet EU standards, citing unsafe toys and toxic jewellery. The Commission asked Shein earlier this year to document on risks linked to illegal goods and content on its market place. Separately it is investigating Temu for not doing enough to prevent sale of illegal products.

As for politics, Shein and Temu are relatively unknown in China. They are tailored exclusively for export markets. So far it does not seem to be much of a news story there. But it was picked up by a few influencers on social media. Nicolas Forissier, France’s trade minister, raised the possibility of Shein’s suspension during his meeting with Chinese authorities. The minister was in Shanghai this week to support about 120 French companies at China’s International Import Exo in Shanghai. The Shein affair also comes after China retaliated against EU tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles by launching three anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations into cognac, French pork, and milk.

Shein and Temu represent a changing world. Those ultra-fast fashion platforms are to the French fashion world what electric cars are to the German car industry. They threaten a symbol of cultural identity as we know it. And for France, nothing gets more personal for the fashion world than Shein opening a department store in Paris. It was boycotted by incumbent retailers but cheered by those looking fo luxury fashion at a cheap price. In that sense, Shein already succeeded where Chinese cars still have to convince European consumers.

One side of the anti-green agenda backlash in the EU is pressure from abroad, especially but not exclusively from the US. See our separate story on how the German government is responding to US and Qatari threats over the EU’s supply chain law. But another is fear from within the EU itself, and its businesses and politicians, about their ramifications. A wholesale reversal of the agenda may be a bit far-fetched. But an incremental rollback is entirely feasible.

We can see that in part from how the EU’s 2040 climate target negotiations went. The EU Council does finally have a deal ahead of a leaders’ summit for the COP30 climate conference that is supposed to kick off today. EU countries can use foreign carbon credits, essentially bought from decarbonising developing countries, to cover 5% of the 90% emission reductions target compared to 1990 levels. This is more than the 3% that the European Commission initially pencilled in. It also contains an option for an additional 5% which can be accounted for by foreign carbon credits. A 90% target has, in effect, become an 80% target.

But that wasn’t the only change the EU countries agreed on. One of the next potential green agenda battlegrounds is an upcoming carbon price for road transport and building emissions. It was initially supposed to come into effect in 2027. The compromise agreed to get the 2040 climate targets through is that the start date will be knocked back by a year, to 2028.

The Commission has already proposed toughening up measures that are designed to keep carbon prices under the scheme at relatively low levels of €45-55 per metric ton of carbon emissions. This would happen by beefing up the so-called Market Stability Reserve for the scheme. We do not expect this to be the last we will hear of the so-called ETS2 either. Even if the scheme comes into effect, we would not be surprised to see these price limits extended further. In the original agreement, they were supposed to go from 2030 onwards.

The Council’s deal on the 2040 target also touched on another carbon market hot potato: what will happen to free allowances under the current carbon pricing regime for industrial emissions. The idea is that with the phase-in of new carbon tariffs, the so-called carbon border adjustment mechanism, or CBAM, free allowances for emissions will gradually be phased out through to 2034. According to the Council’s position statement, it wants the Commission to consider a slower phase-out from 2028 onwards. That would also presumably mean a slower CBAM phase-in.

At the same time, the EU’s biggest emissions targets are not changing. We are still supposed to reach net-zero by 2050, and 55% emissions reductions versus 1990 levels by 2030. But the intermediate targets and carbon pricing mechanisms to get there are being watered down. This has a certain Augustinian quality to it. How long this contradiction can continue for remains to be seen.  

The biggest thud we are likely to hear in Europe in the next few years is the collision between wishful thinking about Ukraine and its inevitable rendezvous with reality. Kaja Kallas, the EU’s High Representative, yesterday treated us to unfiltered display of wishful thinking when she set out a concrete target date for EU accession by Ukraine, Moldova, and various legacy candidates like Montenegro and Albania. She spoke on the occasion of a report that – if you read it – makes it very clear that Ukraine is moving further away from meeting the criteria – and it’s not all war-related. The EU, too, would need reforms, especially on finance and majority voting, for which we do not detect support either.

An FAZ editorial on this issue is right to call out Kallas’s wishful thinking. But comfort blanket-type thinking is also present in this comment. Ukraine’s supporters never say: we need to raise taxes, cut social spending, buy weapons and then send them on to Ukraine. What they say instead, as FAZ did this morning: Europe must do more. In other words, someone else.

This is why Ukraine is losing this war. There is still fighting going on in Pokrovsk, but Russia is now in control of most of the town. The industrial city of Kramatorsk will be the next target. There now is a plausible scenario that Vladimir Putin will achieve the occupation of the four oblasts, which he set out as his original war goal.

What Kallas’s virtue-signalling comment tells us is that they have no strategy whatsoever.

Greece, Cyprus and Israel are seeking to revive the energy triangle under the 3+1 format with the US. A meeting has been arranged between energy ministers of the three countries and the US counterpart at the sidelines of the Transatlantic Energy cooperation conference hosted by Greece this week.

Talks are expected to focus on the major energy projects in the region:  the Vertical Corridor towards Ukraine and the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC). Both projects are US priorities, writes Macropolis.

The vertical corridor is a major European energy infrastructure initiative designed to create a north–south natural gas transmission network between Southeastern and Central Europe, involving Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Ukraine and Moldova. It is a major transport extension route for LNG when it arrives in the ports of Greece to reach the landlocked Eastern European countries. It is not hard to see the business case for the US and its own LNG exports.

The IMEC was launched at the G20 summit in New Delhi in 2023 as an infrastructure initiative to connect India to Europe through a series of rail, road, and sea networks across the Middle East. It is a flagship project for economic cooperation in the region and to reduce reliance on transportation bottlenecks such as the Suez Canal. Though the idea of linking ports in the Gulf, like Jebel Ali in Dubai and Haifa in Israel via rail through Jordan, are heavily dependent on the stability of Israeli-Arab relations. The project includes plans to lay cables, green hydrogen pipelines and high-speed data cables to increase energy diversification and digital connectivity.

This ambitious project is as geopolitical as it could get, involving key players and some of the most conflicted regions. The war in Gaza has delayed its start, but partners have returned to the negotiation table with new enthusiasm this year in their desire to secure supply chains. The project is now in a critical phase with many meetings to define the next phases with a focus on operationalising logistics and tangible outcomes.

For the US, the project is of strategic importance and is a counterbalance to China’s dominance in the region. It is often portrayed in the media as the western backed alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The EU too, included IMEC in its Mediterranean Pact as one of their flagship projects.

When Aleksandar Vucic and Viktor Orbán jointly opened the Novi Sad railway station in 2022, it was meant to be a symbol of Serbia’s progress and regional connectivity. But as the one-year anniversary of the station’s collapse was marked over the weekend – a tragedy that killed sixteen people – that image has come to capture the uneasy tension between the EU’s strategic interests and a regime marked by corruption and an increasingly authoritarian drift.

The EU is dependent on President Vucic to safeguard its interests in the Western Balkans – notably, securing access to Serbia’s lithium. The resource is central to the EU’s efforts to reduce dependence on China and secure critical minerals for its green transition, a goal reinforced in the Critical Raw Materials Act. Serbia holds one of Europe’s largest lithium deposits in the Jadar Valley mine, which could supply up to 90% of Europe’s lithium demand. However, this reliance has tied Brussels to an increasingly authoritarian government at odds with its own citizens, where corruption, media control, and democratic backsliding have fuelled widespread mistrust of both Vucic and the European project.

Under Vucic, Serbia has maintained close ties with Russia and China while continuing to present itself as a leading EU candidate. The accession process has been marked by selective oversight, with Brussels providing roughly €300 million in annual grants and exerting limited pressure over Serbia’s democratic backsliding and refusal to align with EU sanctions against Moscow. Vucic’s close alignment with Orbán has also raised concerns that Serbia’s accession could strengthen the pro-Russia camp led by Hungary and Slovakia. Yet in 2024, Belgrade supplied around €800m worth of arms to Kyiv, and fears of pushing Serbia further towards Beijing and Moscow have deterred stronger criticisms from Brussels. This caution is reflected in the EU’s relatively measured response to the protests, in the form of a recent European Parliament resolution condemning state repression.

The protests that began after the Novi Sad railway station collapse last November have evolved into a nationwide movement demanding accountability and free elections. Over the weekend, tens of thousands returned to the streets to mark the first anniversary, observing sixteen minutes of silence for the victims before renewing calls for Vucic’s resignation. Many Serbs now view Brussels as complicit in sustaining Vucic's regime, with support for EU membership falling from 64% in 2020 to just 33% in 2025, according to a Eurobarometer survey.

Unlike earlier demonstrations in Serbia, this movement has persisted, fuelled by deeper anger and a growing loss of trust in Vucic’s government. And as the protests continue a year on, the EU’s ambitions in the Western Balkans remain tied to a mistrusted and brittle regime.

The German car industry had a really bad year. The chip shortage problem is the latest crisis, and the industry is absolutely dependent on this issue being resolved. At least, there is now a mechanism in place that could resolve the issue as we write in our lead story.

But the bigger long-term problem are not related to this. VW downgraded its forecasts three times this year. We have seen problems popping in all areas of the Germany car industry – at Mercedes and Porsche in particular. BMW is the best of the bunch.

The Nexperia chip shortages give the industry an excuse for finger-pointing, but this does not deflect from the underlying trend - that they are all struggling with electro-mobility. They were late in the game – and massively underestimated the transition. The watering-down of the 2035 deadline for the fuel-driven car will provide some relief, but no solution. This would be like producing typewriters in the 21st century.

We hear a lot of comments lately that it is regulation that killed the car industry. We disagree. It is mostly poor decisions by companies. In Europe, the car industry has been a virtual co-regulator. The industry supported the 2035 target. The long-term success of the German car industry depended critically on its ability to set regulatory standards for the entire industry, globally through the EU. This is also what gave the EU the confidence to do the same in the area of tech regulation. They found, very much to their surprise, that this success did not translate to new sectors, and especially not to sectors where the EU is not a leading producer. The big problem for the German car industry is that they cannot set the standards for the next generation of cars. They are in the business of trying to catch up. They are in the process of losing their regulatory monopoly.

There is already pressure coming from the US to accept mutual recognition of standards for vehicles. Ursula von der Leyen agreed to this in her trade deal with Trump. We will see similar issues coming up in the EU’s trade relations with China.

We still see some hope for the Germans in the luxury end of the market. But a mid-range self-driving car is ultimately more luxurious than a high-end German limousine, unless you have a chauffeur. The business model of the German car industry is that it innovates at the top end of the range, letting the technological benefits trickle down the ranges over time, eventually reaching the smallest cars. This is not how it works in China.

The car industry will not die. But we are struggling to see a healthy ecosystem for mass-market cars in the future.