Olaf Scholz is not going to win his re-election in 2025 based on his economic record. His plan is to win it on the basis of a big geopolitical bet - a commitment not to send German troops to Ukraine no matter what. 

The pledge came immediately after Emmanuel Macron's public ruminations last week about sending ground troops to Ukraine. The comments spooked the Germans. The normally reticent Scholz immediately walked into a town hall meeting, and rejected the idea on the record. Linked to this rejection is his long-standing refusal to send Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine. Scholz says the missiles would require German personnel on the ground. While this is technically true, this is nevertheless a misleading statement. They would require military advisers and experts, not German ground troops fighting the Russians.

The dispatch of troops is the reddest of all of Scholz' red lines. Speaking from his office on the second anniversary of the start of the Ukraine war, the chancellor pledged "no German involvement in the war - a fact that our soldiers can rely on. And that you can rely on." This is so categorical that I struggle to see him moving back from this position even if circumstances were to change. 

It has become typical of the modern German political discourse that politicians frame their positions in terms of red lines rather than strategic goals. They do this in economic policy. Political debate descends into a contest of competing red lines. This is what makes Germany such a difficult partner for others. Scholz has boxed himself, and his country, into a corner. 

For Ukraine, this is a disaster. Germany is its second largest military and financial supporter. The US is the largest, but US support for Ukraine is on hold in Congress. If Donald Trump were to win the presidential elections, the European allies would have to support Ukraine on its own. Germany would be the biggest one. Ukraine's main hope now lies with a shift in US and German politics. At least one of the following would need to happen: Donald Trump gets defeated in November this year; and Scholz gets defeated 10 months later. Or both. The German opposition leader and CDU chairman, Friedrich Merz, is less equivocal in his support for Ukraine than Scholz. In particular, he supports the dispatch of the Taurus cruise missiles. 

German journalists have pointed out parallels to 2003 when Gerhard Schröder opposed the US war against Iraq. The decision had broad public support. Back then, Schröder had Jacques Chirac on his side. This time Germany is on its own. 

Scholz is not trying to realign with Vladimir Putin. That phase of German politics is definitely over. In contrast to Schröder, Scholz was never part of the pro-Putin camp in German politics. But under Scholz, Germany will at least try to revert to its old role as a geopolitical fence-sitter. 

I would still expect Scholz to continue supporting Ukraine, and to send ammunition, anti-air craft systems, and money. But he differs with his western allies in one important respect. He would be more than happy with a settlement that would end the war based on current battle lines. 

Even such a more modest war goal would still require the delivery of at least some offensive weapons. The West would need to step up its support for Ukraine even to get to this point. 

By turning the refusal to send troops into the defining issue of his political existence, Scholz is making a huge geopolitical bet. I do not think it will work for him nearly as well as it did for Schröder in 2003 because he is not nearly as popular. People don't trust him, including people who might otherwise agree with his stance on weapons for Ukraine.

At the same time, he is tapping into an underlying unease in the country about the war. This is something Germany's allies, and Scholz' critics abroad would be well advised to register. Polls show that only a small majority of the German electorate favours weapon deliveries. Scholz is taking a ruthlessly populist position by exploiting a deep underlying fear of Russia. 

I am reminded of a remark by Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the German president. When he was foreign minister, he said Germans would never again fight the Russians under any circumstances. That was last decade's red line. 

Scholz' argument is that ground troops would lead to an inevitable escalation. The spectre of Donald Trump looms large. Without the US nuclear umbrella, Germany has a strategic problem. This led Scholz to the conclusion that Germany cannot afford to engage in a war with Russia. 

Macron, by contrast, would like to keep his options open. Strategic ambiguity is part of warfare. In contrast to Scholz, Macron at least has done some serious reflexions of the strategic choices. I would not rule out that Macron knew what he was doing and that he was risking a break with Berlin on purpose. Germany and France have become unreliable allies to each other.

What I expect to see as a consequence of Scholz' U-turn is a realignment in European security as part of which the UK and France will cooperate more closely. Scholz' gambit will damage the EU and Nato, and Germany's role in both. They have certainly damaged Franco-German relations. The two countries have been diverging strategically for quite some time, in energy policy for example.

In March 2022, Scholz gave his one and only memorable speech when he declared a change of era - Zeitenwende. This was Germany's colour revolution, a "Berlin spring" during which Scholz tried to anchor Germany more firmly in the western alliance. It is over.